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JUSTIFYING THE DENIAL OF WRONGFUL DEATH
ACTIONS TO COHABITANTS
The California wrongful death statute bars a cohabitant's
claim for his or her partner's tortious death. Moreover, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Justus v. Atchisonfound that a common
law wrongful death remedy is precluded because the state legisla-
ture has occupied the field. This Comment concedes the weakness
in the Justus court's analysis and investigates the wrongful death
statute from its 1862 inception to the current version. The Com-
ment concludes that the Justus court's conclusion is correct and
that policy considerations militate against recognizing the cohab-
itant's wrongful death cause of action.
INTRODUCTION
In Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme Court refused to
label cohabitation an illicit union, recognizing instead that "[t ] he
mores of society have indeed changed so radically in regard to co-
habitation that we cannot impose a [legal] standard based on al-
leged moral considerations that have ... been so widely
abandoned.... ."' Although the Marvin court did not equate the
rights of cohabitants 2 with those of spouses,3 many view the case,
in conjunction with other legal developments, 4 as a springboard to
1. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 (1976).
2. In this Comment, a "cohabitant" is defined as a person steadily living with
another under marriage-like conditions without the good faith belief that he is le-
gally married. The term "meretricious spouse" which frequently appears in re-
lated literature is not used because "meretricious" connotes an illicit relationship.
With the 1975 repeal of California Penal Code sections 269(a) and (b), criminal
sanctions for cohabitation were removed; the lifestyle is not illicit except, to some,
in a moral sense. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 269(a)-(b) (West 1970) (repealed 1975).
3. In Marvin, the court refused to extend the Family Law Act to unmarried
persons. The court expressly stated that the cohabitant should be treated as any
other unmarried person. A decision to equate cohabitant with spouse was unac-
ceptable because it would "resurrect the doctrine of common law marriage, which
was abolished in California by statute in 1895." 18 Cal. 3d at 684 n.24, 557 P.2d at
122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.24.
4. Numerous cases and statutes illustrate a trend towards legal equivalence
between cohabitant and spouse. See Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078
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general legal equivalence between cohabitant and spouse.5 Nev-
ertheless, California continues to deny such legal equivalence in
wrongful death actions;6 the spouse may bring a wrongful death
suit upon her husband's tortious death, but the cohabitant is pre-
cluded upon her partner's.
The rationale for this distinction stems primarily from the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's analysis of the California wrongful death
statute7 in Justus v. Atchison.8 The court in Justus denied a
(D.N.J. 1980) (proof of legal marriage is not an essential element of a loss of con-
sortium claim); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 375 (1976) (regulation prohibiting cohabitants from public housing is an in-
fringement of privacy rights). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1980)
(prohibiting housing discrimination based on marital status).
5. E.g., Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. App. 3d 946, 182
Cal. Rptr. 708 (1982), in which the court relies on Marvin to extend unemployment
benefits to a cohabitant.
6. Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 68 (1981).
7. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1982) reads:
(a) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another, his or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf
may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death,
or in case of the death of such wrongdoer, against the personal represen-
tative of such wrongdoer, whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the
death of the person injured. If any other person is responsible for any
such wrongful act or neglect, the action may also be maintained against
such other person, or in case of his or her death, his or her personal repre-
sentatives. In every action under this section, such damages may be given
as under all the circumstances of the case, may be just, but shall not in-
clude damages recoverable under Section 573 of the Probate Code. The
respective rights of the heirs in any award shall be determined by the
court. Any action brought by the personal representatives of the decedent
pursuant to the provisions of Section 573 of the Probate Code may be
joined with an action arising out of the same wrongful act or neglect be
brought pursuant to the provisions of this section. If an action be brought
pursuant to the provisions of this section and a separate action arising out
of the same wrongful act or neglect be brought pursuant to the provisions
of Section 573 of the Probate Code, such actions shall be consolidated for
trial on the motion of any interested party.
(b) For the purposes of subdivision (a), "heirs" mean only the following:
(1) Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of
the decedent according to the provisions of Division 2 (commencing with
Section 200) of the Probate Code,
(2) Whether or not qualified under paragraph (1), if they were depen-
dent on the decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative spouse,
stepchildren, and parents. As used in this paragraph, "putative spouse"
means the surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found
by the court to have believed in good faith that the marriage to the dece-
dent was valid.
(3) Minors, whether or not qualified under paragraphs (1) or (2), if, at
the time of the decedent's death, they resided for the previous 180 days in
the decedent's household and were dependent upon the decedent for one-
half or more of their support. Nothing in this subdivision shall be con-
strued to change or modify the definition of "heirs" under any other provi-
sion of law.
8. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
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wrongful death remedy to parents of a stillborn fetus, because it
concluded that the state legislature intended to "occupy the
field"9 of wrongful death and to preclude any common law expan-
sion of the remedy. The statute did not provide a remedy to par-
ents for a fetus' death;10 therefore, plaintiffs could not state a
cause of action.
The statute similarly fails to provide a wrongful death remedy
to a surviving cohabitant." Courts applying California law in Vo-
gel v. Pan American World Airways,12 Aspinall v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. ,13 and Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines14 rec-
ognize this statutory exclusion and rely heavily on Justus in their
refusal to grant common law wrongful death rights to
cohabitants.15
Although the Justus court's conclusion is correct, its statutory
analysis is superficial. The court, in its one-paragraph statutory
examination, anchors its legislative preemption holding solely on
the following: (1) the intent of the first wrongful death statute
(passed in 1862) was to create a new cause of action; (2) the stat-
ute is phrased in terms of general application; and (3) the legisla-
ture has amended the statute several times.16 The Justus court
failed to investigate seriously the amendments, bills, and express
statements of legislative intent which form the wrongful death
statutory scheme. Moreover, the court failed to specify any statu-
tory elements which support the preemption conclusion.17 One
writer, after attempting the task the Justus court found unneces-
9. Id. at 574, 565 P.2d at 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
10. The statute provides a remedy for the death of "a person." The court held
that a fetus was not "a person."
11. CAL Cirv. PRoc. CODE § 377(b) (West Supp. 1982). See supra note 7 for the
statute's text.
12. 450 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
13. 625 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1980).
14. 118 Cal. App. 3d 155, 173 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1981).
15. Vogel cites Justus twice in the same paragraph concluding "[t]he plain
fact is that 'meretricious spouses' are not included in the statutory definition of
'heirs."' 450 F. Supp. at 226. Aspinall similarly parrots Justus to confine the ac-
tion: "the right of a survivor to recover under the wrongful death theory is purely
statutory ... ." 625 F.2d at 327.
16. 19 Cal. 3d at 574, 565 P.2d at 129, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
17. The court made its legislative preemption conclusion after merely listing
its three general findings. The Justus court apparently ignored the proposition
that "courts may and should have recourse to available extrinsic aids in order to
discover the meaning and purpose of legislation." Shafer v. Registered Pharma-
cists Union, 16 Cal. 2d 379, 383, 106 P.2d 404, 405 (1940).
sary, concludes that the legislature did not intend to foreclose
common law expansion of wrongful death and that the Justus
court erred.1 8 If the Justus legislative intent conclusion fails, Vo-
gel, Aspinall, and Harrod are threatened, with the result that the
cohabitant may not be precluded from wrongful death actions.
Such exclusion, however, is demanded by the statute and justified
by policy considerations.
This Comment will supply Justus and its progeny with the firm
rationale that the cases lack.19 An examination of the California
wrongful death statutory scheme will reveal legislative intent to
preclude the remedy's judicial expansion. Policy justifications for
the cohabitant's exclusion will also be presented. First, a brief
historical survey will place in context the statute and the common
law approach to wrongful death litigation.
WRONGFUL DEATH AND THE COMMON LAW2 0
In Baker v. Bolton, an 1808 nisi prius decision, Lord Ellenbor-
ough declared that "[iun a Civil court, the death of a human being
could not be complained of as an injury .... -"21 This principle,
stated without supporting authority or any rationale, apparently
derives from the early English law felony-merger doctrine.22 This
doctrine denied civil recovery for an act constituting both a felony
and a tort; the offense against the Crown preempted the tort, re-
sulting in the felon's property being forfeited to the Crown. Be-
cause all intentional or negligent homicide was felonious, a civil
suit for wrongful death was deemed superfluous and was not
permitted.
Baker's significance to California law is twofold. First, although
the felony-merger doctrine was never applied in this state,
23
18. Comment, The Rights of Meretricious Spouses to Wrongful Death Actions,
13 PAc. L.J. 125 (1981).
19. The California Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the cohabi-
tant wrongful death issue. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), hints that such a review might be forthcoming, with its com-
ment in support of Justice Tobriner's concurring opinion in Justus. Id. at 834 n.29,
174 Cal. Rptr. at 398 n.29. Justice Tobriner concurred in the Justus majority's con-
clusion, but not in its legislative preemption finding. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d
at 586, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (Tobriner, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Bird's dissent from a hearing denial of Harrod indicates further support for an im-
minent review. See Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 118 Cal. App. 3d at 158,
173 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
20. See generally S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (2d ed. 1975)
(comprehensive survey of the historical aspects of wrongful death).
21. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
22. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rule, 13 VAND. L.
REV. 605, 613-16 (1960).
23. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
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Baker became authority for the dogmatically-applied rule that no
action for wrongful death exists, unless and only to the extent
provided by statute.24 Second, Baker's harsh result, which often
left surviving family members destitute, inspired California's first
wrongful death statute.
25
A Common Law Remedy
Before the 1970 United States Supreme Court decision in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines,26 which created a common law
wrongful death action, only Hawaii27 consistently rejected Baker.
Other states clung steadfastly to the proposition that a wrongful
death suit can only be maintained within the parameters of the
applicable statute.
The Moragne Court held that a widow whose longshoreman
husband's death occurred on navigable Florida waters could bring
a wrongful death action notwithstanding the fact that neither the
Florida statute28 nor the various federal statutes granted such a
24. Kramer v. Market St. R.R. Co., 25 Cal. 434 (1864).
25. The preamble to Lord Campbell's Act, the 1846 English wrongful death
statute, declares: "[I]t is often times right and expedient that the Wrongdoer in
such Case should be answerable in Damages . . . ." 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93. The
remedy is expedient by providing a means to the end of financial stability for the
decedent's family. Lord Campbell's Act is considered the progenitor of American
wrongful death statutes. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 20, at 29. Because § 1 of Califor-
nia's first wrongful death statute is almost verbatim of Lord Campbell's Act, a rea-
sonable inference exists that the purpose of the California legislature was
identical to that of the English Parliament. Section I of Lord Campbell's Act
states:
Whenever the Death of a Person shall be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect,
or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if Death had
not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an action and re-
cover Damages in respect thereof, then and in every such Case the Person
who would have been liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an
action for Damages ....
2 S. SPEISER, supra note 20, at 643 (text of Lord Campbell's Act).
Section 1 of California's 1862 statute reads:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had
not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and re-
cover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person
who, or the corporation which, would have been liable if death had not en-
sued, shall be liable to an action for damages ....
Act of Apr. 26, 1862, ch. 330, § 1, 1862 Cal. Stat. 447, 447.
26. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
27. Kake v. Horton, 2 Hawaii 209 (1860); Rahlfing v. Moses Akiona Ltd., 45 Ha-
waii 373, 369 P.2d 96 (1961), reh'g denied, 45 Hawaii 443, 369 P.2d 114 (1962), over-
ruled on other grounds, Greene v. Texeira, 54 Hawaii 231, 505 P.2d 1169 (1973).
28. The Florida statute did not encompass unseaworthiness as a basis of liabil-
right.29 The Court finally rejected Baker, noting that the felony-
merger doctrine had never existed in the United States and that
"[t] he most likely reason that the English rule was adopted.., is
simply that it had the blessing of age."3 0 Having destroyed Baker
for lack of compelling rationale,31 the Court held that a common
law wrongful death action existed absent legislative intent to oc-
cupy the field of recovery.32 After Moragne, therefore, a statutory
and a more expansive common law wrongful death action may co-
exist, provided that the legislative remedy is not viewed as
exclusive.
The Moragne Court established guidelines to determine
whether a statute should be viewed as mandating an exclusive
remedy. Factors demonstrating an intent to allow common law
expansion include: (1) a course of legislation rather than one en-
actment; (2) a statute that deals with a series of situations; and
(3) the existence of similar legislation in other jurisdictions. Fac-
tors showing legislative intent to occupy the field are: (1) a stat-
ute that seeks to promote conflicting interests; and (2) a
legislative aim prescribed with particularity.33 One writer sug-
gests that the Court also demands an affirmative indication of in-
tent to occupy before judicial creativity is precluded;34 the Court,
however, neither lists this requirement in its formulation nor de-
fines what such an affirmative indication might be.35
ity. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1965), repealed by Florida Wrongful Death Act of 1972, ch.
72-35, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.16 (West Supp. 1982)).
29. 46 U.S.C. §§ 688, 761-767 (1976).
30. 398 U.S. at 386.
31. The Moragne Court not only dismissed Baker, but also rejected the follow-
ing rationales given in support of the common law rule: (1) difficulty of damage
computation; (2) "repugnance to setting a price on human life"; and (3) "the an-
cient common law rule that a personal cause of action in tort does not survive...
its possessor. ... ." 398 U.S. at 385.
32. Moragne's significance transcends maritime law. The Justus court, in a
non-maritime setting, accepted the Moragne principle that a common law wrong-
ful death action may exist. Moreover, the Justus court approved the use of the
guidelines that the Moragne Court set forth to determine legislative intent. See
Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d at 574, 565 P.2d at 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103. In Gau-
dette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972), Massachusetts followed
Moragne in a non-maritime case. Therefore, the California Supreme Court, utiliz-
ing Moragne, could rule that, as a matter of common law, a cohabitant may bring a
wrongful death action regardless of the statutory exclusion. Justus would not be
an insurmountable barrier to this conclusion because California courts will recon-
sider prior statutory construction when appropriate. See People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.
2d 1119, 1128, 459 P.2d 225, 230, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902 (1969).
33. 398 U.S. at 392.
34. Comment, supra note 18, at 131.
35. After listing its guidelines, the Court begins Part I of the opinion noting.
"We find that Congress has given no affirmative indication of an intent to preclude
... " 398 U.S. at 393. This appears more a threshold issue to be disposed of
before the guidelines can be applied rather than another factor to be examined.
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INTERPRETATION OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
An examination of the California statute's words and context
reveals legislative intent to list an exclusive class of plaintiffs and
to limit judicial creativity. Because the Justus court accepted the
Moragne Court's analysis and guidelines,36 the Moragne criteria
furnish a baseline against which the California statute will be
measured. The investigation of the statute's words, context, and
extrinsic material 37 will disclose that, substantively and procedur-
ally, the legislature has regulated wrongful death with
particularity.38
Language
The words in the wrongful death statute manifest an intent to
list an exclusive class of plaintiffs and generally to limit common
law activity. California Code of Civil Procedure section 377(a) al-
lows the deceased's heirs or personal representatives to com-
mence the action; subsection (b) declares that for the purposes of
subdivision (a), "'heirs' mean only the following .... ,"39 Be-
cause "only" denotes exclusivity,40 nothing more or different is to
be added to the specified class of plaintiffs.
Subsections (b) (2) and (b) (3) provide for actions by a depen-
dent putative spouse and a dependent minor. The statute does
not simply name these classes; rather, the legislature has pains-
takingly defined these terms.4 1 These precise definitions show an
36. See supra note 32.
37. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 535 (1947) ("[t]hough we may not end with the words in construing a dis-
puted statute, one certainly begins there").
38. As previously discussed, a finding of particularity shows legislative intent
to occupy the field. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 392.
39. See supra note 7 for the statute's text (emphasis added).
40. See WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1703 (2d ed. 1960). Statu-
tory language is generally accorded its plain meaning. Frankfurter, supra note 37,
at 535-36; cf. Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929) ("there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean")
(Holmes, J.); see also CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 1861 (West 1955) (terms to be con-
strued in their general acceptation).
41. See supra note 7 for the statutory definitions. Assembly bill No. 428 forms
part of the present scheme. Introduced in January 1975, the bill did not define
"putative spouse" until the third amended version in April. CAl A.B. 428, 1975-76
Reg. Sess. (1975). In 1977, Senate bill No. 404 provided the cause of action for de-
pendent minors. The first draft extended the right to any minor dependent for
one-half of his support On April 21, 1977, the bill was amended to impose the ad-
ditional requirement that the minor must have resided in the decedent's house-
intent to limit judicial creativity. Although factual questions may
arise regarding a putative spouse's good faith belief42 or a minor's
degree of dependence, courts cannot squeeze a cohabitant into
the putative spouse category by manipulating definitions.43 More-
over, these definitions, coupled with the use in subsection (a) of
the word "only," satisfy the Moragne requirement that the legisla-
ture prescribe with particularity before a preemption finding is
warranted.
Context
The wrongful death statute has been amended eight times since
1862. Although the earliest version states that the remedy is for
the "exclusive benefit" of certain persons,4 4 this language was de-
leted in the 1873 amendment.45 Similar phraseology did not reap-
pear until the 1975 insertion of "only." Because the legislature
deliberately 46 reintroduced the concept of an exclusive list of ben-
eficiaries, subsection (b) must be recognized as an express indi-
cator of intent to limit the remedy rather than as inadvertent
draftsmanship.
The numerous amendments also illustrate a legislative trend to-
ward regulating the remedy with increasing particularity. The
1862 statute established a cause of action whenever the death of
"a person" was caused by wrongful act.47 In 1873, the action was
hold. On August 22, 1977, the bill was amended to require that the minor must
have resided in the decedent's household for 180 days prior to the wrongful death.
CAL. S.B. 404, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1977).
42. See In re Paris Air Crash, 420 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
43. Cf. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) ("[i]f
Congress... use[s] a certain phrase with a more limited meaning than might be
attributed to it by common practice, it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider
that fact when we come to interpret a statute").
44. See supra note 25 for section 1 of the 1862 statute. Section 3 stated:
Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal
representatives of such deceased person, and the amount recovered in
every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next
of kin of such deceased person, and shall be distributed to such widow
and next of kin, in the proportions provided by law in relation to the dis-
tribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate; and in every
such action, the jury may give such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as
they shall deem fair and just ....
Act of Apr. 26, 1862, ch. 330, § 3, 1862 Cal. Stat. 447, 448 (current version at CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1982)) (emphasis added).
45. Amendment of 1873, ch. 383, § 40, 1873-74 Code Am. 294 (current version at
CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1982)).
46. Comparing amended statutes is a legitimate tool of statutory interpreta-
tion. See Van Every v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563, 566 (1881). "Changes in wording and phra-
seology are presumed to have been deliberately made .... ." People v. Marshall,
121 Cal. App. 3d 627, 645, 175 Cal. Rptr. 497, 506 (1981) (quoting Estate of Simpson,
43 Cal. 2d 594, 600, 275 P.2d 467, 470 (1954)).
47. See supra note 25.
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made much more precise: a claim exists only upon an adult's
death; the defendant's employer may also be liable; and the act
causing death need not be such as would have entitled the de-
ceased to recover had death not ensued. 8 In 1935 the legislature
provided a cause of action upon the death of a minor who is sur-
vived by either a spouse or a child.49
This extensive legislative fine-tuning continued. The 1949
amendment adds parents to the class of survivors who are eligible
to bring an action for a minor's death.5 0 In 1968 the word "heirs"
retained its Probate Code definition for wrongful death purposes;
however, the 1968 version allows dependent parents who are not
heirs to recover for an adult child's tortious death.51
The 1975 amendment essentially placed the statute in its cur-
rent form. The legislature declared that, in wrongful death ac-
tions, "heirs" include: (1) those entitled to take by intestacy
under the Probate Code; (2) a dependent putative spouse; (3) any
dependent children of the putative spouse; (4) dependent
48. See supra note 45.
49. The 1935 statute stated:
When the death of a person not being a minor, or when the death of a mi-
nor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or wife or child or
children, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or
personal representatives may maintain an action for damages against the
person causing the death, or if such person be employed by another per-
son who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such other
person.
Act of Apr. 27, 1935, ch. 108, § 1, 1935 Cal. Stat. 460, 461 (current version at CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1982)).
50. The 1949 statute stated:
When the death of a person not being a minor, or when the death of a mi-
nor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or wife or child or
children or father or mother, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for
damages against the person causing the death, or in case of the death of
such wrongdoer, against the personal representative of such wrongdoer,
whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person
injured.
Act of July 28, 1949, ch. 1380, § 4, 1949 Cal. Stat. 2400, 2401 (current version at CAL.
Cirv. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1982)).
51. The 1968 statute stated.
When the death of a person not being a minor, or when the death of a mi-
nor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or wife or child or
children or father or mother, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs, and his dependent parents, if any, who are not heirs, or
personal representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for dam-
ages against the person causing the death ....
Act of July 25, 1968, ch. 766, § 1, 1968 Cal. Stat. 1488, 1488 (current version at CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1982)).
stepchildren; and (5) dependent parents.52 Finally, the 1977 legis-
lation included dependent minors in the definition of heirs.
53
These substantive changes have been paralleled by changes in
the procedural aspects of wrongful death. The 1862 statute appor-
tioned damages, which were determined by a jury, in accordance
with intestate succession law.5 4 By 1949 the legislature expressly
provided for the action's survival upon defendant's death.55 The
1961 amendment declared that the heirs' respective rights shall be
determined by the court and included joinder and consolidation
provisions. 56
Although such detail satisfies the Moragne Court's requirement
of statutory particularity, an alternate interpretation is that the
amendments illustrate responses to specific problems that came
to the legislature's attention; under Moragne, therefore, common
law activity could still be warranted.5 7 Proponents of this view
emphasize the relationship between Evans v. Shanklin5 8 and the
1968 amendment as well as that between Steed v. Imperial Air-
lines59 and the revised 1975 statute.60 Such emphasis and inter-
pretation, however, are misplaced.
The Evans court, interpreting the 1935 wrongful death statute,
denied a cause of action to a deceased's dependent parent who
was not an heir. Thirty-two years after the decision, the statute
was amended to allow dependent parents a wrongful death claim.
Conceding that the 1968 statute prevented recurrence of Evans'
harsh result, legislation after a thirty-two year hiatus cannot real-
52. The 1975 statute is identical to the current version except that the 1975 ver-
sion lacks the provision for dependent minors. See supra note 7 for the current
statute. See also Act of Aug. 25, 1975, ch. 334, § 1, 1975 Cal. Stat. 783, 783 (current
version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1982)); Act of Oct. 1, 1975, ch.
1241, § 5.5, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3187, 3189 (current version at CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 377
(West Supp. 1982)).
53. See supra note 7.
54. See supra note 44.
55. See supra note 50.
56. The relevant portions of the 1961 amendment read:
The respective rights of the heirs in any award shall be determined by the
court. Any action brought by the personal representatives of the decedent
pursuant to the provisions of Section 573 of the Probate Code may be
joined with an action arising out of the same wrongful act or neglect
brought pursuant to the provisions of this section. If an action be brought
pursuant to the provisions of this section and a separate action arising out
of the same wrongful act or neglect be brought pursuant to the provisions
of Section 573 of the Probate Code, such actions shall be consolidated for
trial on the motion of any interested party.
Act of June 2, 1961, ch. 657, § 5, 1961 Cal. Stat. 1867, 1869 (current version at CAL
CMv. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1982)).
57. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
58. 16 Cal. App. 2d 358, 60 P.2d 554 (1936).
59. 12 Cal. 3d 15, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1974).
60. See Comment, supra note 18, at 135-37.
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istically be termed responsive.
61
Similarly, in Steed, an unadopted stepchild was denied a rem-
edy for her stepfather's wrongful death. Stepchildren were not
heirs under the 1968 statute. Although one year after the decision
the amended statute included dependent stepchildren as heirs,
this time proximity does not outweigh other factors showing that
the 1975 amendment was not intended to be a response to Steed.
One such factor is the precise issue raised in Steed: whether an
unadopted child led to believe that the deceased was her biologi-
cal father 62 may bring the wrongful death suit. The 1975 amend-
ment encompassed far more than this narrow issue by expanding
heirs to include all dependent stepchildren, the putative spouse,
and dependent children of the putative spouse. Although perhaps
inspired by Steed, the statute cannot be deemed responsive when
classes not represented in the case are brought within the stat-
ute's provisions. Moreover, extrinic sources of legislative intent,
the state Assembly and Senate bills which formed the 1975 legis-
lation, demonstrate that the 1975 statute was not intended as a re-
sponse to the case.
Extrinsic Sources
Assembly bill number 428 and Senate bill number 766, which
combined to produce the 1975 wrongful death statute, show that
the legislature specifically omitted reference to Steed in its state-
ment of intent. Assembly bill 428, introduced three months before
the senate bill, states: "It is the further intent of the Legislature
that the amendment to Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure
... alter the rule of law enunciated in... Steed v. Imperial Air
Lines ... "63 A Justus critic chastizes that court for ignoring this
statement and maintains that "[t] his expression of legislative in-
tent certainly qualifies as a reflection of 'nothing more than the
dimensions of the particular problem that came to the attention of
the legislature.' "64
61. Analysis of a statute's chronology is a recognized interpretive device. Cf.
Garcia v. State, 247 Cal. App. 2d 814, 816, 56 Cal. Rptr. 80, 82 (1967) (chronology of
two statutes to discern legislative intent).
62. Plaintiff was not simply a stepchild. The "stepfather" represented to plain-
tiff and to all the world that she was his biological daughter, encouraged her to use
his surname, and led plaintiff to believe that he was in fact her father. 12 Cal. 3d
at 118 n.2, 524 P.2d at 802 n.2, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 330 n.2.
63. CAL. A.B. 428, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. § 2 (1975).
64. Comment, supra note 18, at 138.
The most likely reason the Justus court ignored this intent
statement is that it was intentionally omitted when the law was
finally enacted. Senate bill 766 contained its own version of the
wrongful death statute. Until the bill's third amendment in Au-
gust 1975, the proposal restated the 1968 wrongful death statute,
but substituted non-sexist language for existing sexist terms.65
The third amended senate bill contains two wrongful death stat-
utes. Section 5 restates the 1968 law. Section 5.5 restates the as-
sembly's version (A.B. 428) but deletes the statement of legislative
intent quoted above. The senate bill's own statement of intent al-
layed the confusion resulting from two wrongful death proposals:
if both the assembly and senate bills were enacted, the wrongful
death statute was to be that stated in section 5.5 of the senate
bill.66 Both bills were chaptered and became effective in 1976.67
Section 5.5 of Senate bill 766 became law in accordance with the
senate's statement of intent. The assembly's allusion to Steed
was expressly deleted. This exclusion indicates an intention dif-
ferent from that expressed in Assembly bill 428.68 Therefore, the
1975 amendment is intended neither to be a response to Steed nor
to the evidence that the legislature has only responded to particu-
lar problems that came to its attention in wrongful death
litigation. 69
65. CAL. S.B. 766 eventually was titled "Sexual Equality" and replaced "he"
with "he or she," and "his" with "his or hers" in various statutes. CAL. S.B. 766,
1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1975).
66. The Senate bill stated:
It is the intent of the Legislature, if this bill and Assembly Bill No. 428 are
both chaptered ... both bills amend Section 377 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, and this bill is chaptered after Assembly Bill No. 428, that the
amendments to Section 377 proposed by both bills be given effect and in-
corporated ... in the form set forth in Section 5.5 of this act. [If this oc-
curs,] Section 5 of this act shall not become operative.
Id. § 10.
67. CAL. A.B. 428, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1975) was chaptered on August 25, 1975. 1
ASSEMBLY FINAL HiSTORY 319 (1975-76). CAL. S.B. 766, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1975)
was chaptered on October 1, 1975. 1 SENATE INAL HISTORY 381 (1975-76).
68. When the legislature omits a particular provision in a later enactment re-
lated to the same subject matter, the omission indicates a different intention. See
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Solano County, 90 Cal. App. 3d 662, 667, 153 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549
(1979). This conclusion is not affected by the rule that unpassed bills have little
value as evidence of legislative intent, because both CAL. A.B. 428 and CAL. S.B.
766 were passed. See State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Bd., 88 Cal. App. 3d 43, 63, 152 Cal. Rptr. 153, 166 (1979).
69. Neither Assemblyman Ingalls (author of CAL. A.B. 428) nor Senator Rains
(CAL. S.B. 766) could furnish information other than the legislative digest accom-
panying their respective bills. Assembly bill 428, first introduced in January 1975,
had action almost weekly through April 16, 1975. The bill then lay dormant until
August 7, 1975. Note that this four-month lapse roughly coincides with Rains' at-
tempt to delete the legislative intent statement present in the assembly bill.
Moreover, Rains' own bill similarly bogged down between June and August after
almost weekly action. What happened behind the scenes remains unknown; how-
[VOL 20: 417, 1983] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Another extrinsic source of legislative intent, the Legislative
Counsel Digest,70 supports a legislative preemption conclusion.
Assembly bill 428's Digest articulates the conflicting interests
present in wrongful death legislation, conflicts which the Moragne
Court suggests manifest legislative preemption. 71 Enlarging the
class of persons entitled to sue promotes the state interest of hav-
ing tortfeasors rather than society (through welfare payments)
carry the burden of decedent's financial obligations. 72 The legisla-
ture recognizes, however, that restrictions on the class of eligible
plaintiffs are necessary to limit the tortfeasor's potential
liability.7 3
Beyond MORAGNE
Because the previous discussion is largely based on the
Moragne Court's criteria, any invalidation of the Court's test 74
may similarly weaken the legislative preemption conclusion. One
criticism is that the test yields inconsistent conclusions. For ex-
ample, the finding that the legislature has prescribed wrongful
death with particularity derives from examining the statute's con-
text (which is a course of specific legislation). In Moragne, how-
ever, the Court states that particularity demonstrates preemption
ever, one theory is that the Senate was not pleased with expanding the cause of
action to the putative spouse and others, especially with the Assembly's poten-
tially dangerous legislative intent statement tacked onto the bill. The Senate's
compromise was to impose an ultimatum on the Assembly: abandon the intent
statement or revert to the 1968 law (section 5 of CAL. S.B. 766). The Assembly ca-
pitulated. Another theory is that the Senate's preemption of the Assembly's bill is
simply a matter of drafting efficacy. Express preemption avoids practical
problems when two bills dealing with the same subject matter are passed. Never-
theless, the Senate could have both preempted the Assembly and included the
Steed intent statement. Therefore, even a pragmatic approach cannot adequately
weaken the significance of the Senate's deletion.
70. The Legislative Counsel Digest has frequently been used to discern legis-
lative intent. See Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 443, 556 P.2d 1101,
1115, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 664 (1976). The Legislative Counsel assists in law drafting
and publishes an analysis of every bill, the Legislative Counsel Digest. Because
the Digest is analytical and apolitical, it is credible. Comment, The Use of Extrin-
sic Aids in Determining Legislative Intent in California: The Needfor Standard-
ized Criteria, 12 PAc. L.J. 189, 204-06 (1980).
71. 398 U.S. at 392.
72. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL DIGEST § 5 for CAL. A.B. 428, 1975-76 Reg. Sess.
(1975).
73. Id. § 7. Case law similarly articulates the conflicting interests present in
wrongful death legislation. Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666,
114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
74. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for the Moragne test.
and that a course of legislation allows for judicial creativity. The
Court states that common law expansion is warranted when legis-
lation similar to that under consideration exists in other jurisdic-
tions. Because every state has a wrongful death statute,75
difficulties arise in determining this factor's impact on other evi-
dence which leads to a preemption conclusion. The Moragne
problem is ameliorated, however, through an examination of
other preemption cases which support the conclusion of legisla-
tive intent to control wrongful death. Although issues in these
cases range from sterilization to contribution among joint
tortfeasors, their shared theme-that common law practices can-
not be considered when superseded by statutory provisons-al-
lows analogies.
In Guardianship of Kemp,76 a California appellate court turned
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 7254 to determine a pro-
bate court's power to order sterilization of mental incompetents.
The Kemp court concluded that the comprehensive statute re-
quiring examination, notice, hearings, and judicial review pre-
cluded judicial alteration of sterilization requirements. 77 A
wrongful death remedy is not a drastic physical alteration as is
sterilization; nevertheless, the Kemp holding is founded on a de-
termination of legislative intent derived from a comprehensive
statute. The wrongful death statute is similarly comprehensive,
listing specific classes of plaintiffs; providing for the action's sur-
vival; denying certain damages; allowing joinder and consolida-
tion; and providing for judicial apportionment of awards.78
In spite of the impression given by Justus and Kemp, California
courts do not regularly find legislative preemption of common law
power. In American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court79
and Green v. Superior Court,80 the California Supreme Court de-
termined that relevant statutory schemes did not preclude the
court from fashioning common law remedies. In each case, the
court identified factors that show no legislative intent to occupy a
field. The absence of these elements in wrongful death adds sup-
port to a finding of legislative occupation.
In American Motorcycle, the court considered whether the con-
tribution statute precluded judicial creation of comparative in-
demnity. The court's analysis, as generalized, shows that no
75. See Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REv.
402 (1966).
76. 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974).
77. Id. at 763, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
78. See supra note 7 for the statute's text.
79. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
80. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
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preemption exists when the statute (1) preserves a common law
right; (2) provides that such right is superior to that created by
statute; and (3) mandates that the scheme be administered in ac-
cordance with common law principles.8 1 In contrast, the wrongful
death statute does not preserve a common law right; in fact, the
statute created a right not existing at common law.82 Moreover,
the court's role in wrongful death litigation is to apportion the
award among the heirs, not to administer the right according to
common law principles.
83
In Green, the court determined that landlord-tenant statutes,
including one providing a "repair and deduct" tenant remedy, did
not foreclose a common law implied warranty of habitability. The
court emphasized that no legislative occupation exists when
(1) historically, common law remedies have been granted inde-
pendently of the statutes, and (2) statutory remedies are limited
in relation to the harm sought to be alleviated.84 Courts in wrong-
ful death cases, however, have not acted independently of the
statute; rather, the courts consistently confine themselves to the
legislative framework.85 Moreover, the wrongful death statute
does not provide a limited remedy. The six broad classes of plain-
tiffs may recover any amount of damages deemed just.86
81. Specifically, the court noted that the contribution statute preserved the
common law right of indemnity, provided that such right was superior to that of
contribution, and mandated that the scheme be administered in accordance with
equitable principles. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at
602, 578 P.2d at 914, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 197; see also CAL Cirv. PRoc. CODE § 875 (West
1980) (contribution statute).
82. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 381-86.
83. See supra note 7 for the statute's text.
84. Specifically, the court noted a line of constructive eviction cases decided
independently of the statutes. The Green court also commented that the limited
nature of the "repair and deduct" remedy suggested that the statute was not in-
tended to be an exclusive remedy. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d at 630, 517
P.2d at 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 713; see also CAL. CIrV. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1982)
(tenant permitted to spend up to one month's rent to make repairs).
85. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co., 164 Cal. 568, 129 P. 989 (1913);
Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1974).
86. A final argument supporting legislative intent to occupy wrongful death is
based on legislative silence. In 1977, the statute was amended to include depen-
dent minors as heirs. The legislature, with Steed before it, failed to include any
language indicating an intent to allow judicial creativity in wrongful death litiga-
tion. Cases support an implication that this legislative silence indicates an inten-
tion to leave the law as Steed states: legislative occupation of the field. See, e.g.,
Bailey v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 970, 568 P.2d 394, 140 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1977). This
determination of intent through legislative silence is not seriously presented, how-
ever, because California vacillates between Bailey and the view that legislative si-
PoLIcY CONSIDERATIONS
The argument presented above shows that the California legis-
lature has occupied the field of wrongful death and precluded
common law expansion to include cohabitants in the class of eligi-
ble plaintiffs. However, a technical argument detached from pub-
lic policy is of limited value. Therefore, policy considerations are
presented supporting denial of the remedy's expansion. Not only
are the Marvin court's underlying assumptions erroneous, but
practical considerations, social philosophy, and general tort prin-
ciples militate against recognizing the cohabitant's wrongful
death claim.
The Marvin Court's Erroneous Assumptions
The Marvin court makes two basic assumptions about cohabita-
tion which lead to its legitimization of the lifestyle: the preva-
lence of cohabitation and the beneficial long-run effect on
marriage of trial cohabitation periods.87 Empirical research re-
futes these underlying assumptions. Census data reveals that de-
spite a twofold increase in cohabitation during the last decade,
the number of cohabitants "represent a very small portion [2.7
percent] of all persons in 'couple' situations."8 8 Whereas some
scholars predict that cohabitation will increase,89 others suggest
that changed attitudes towards marriage are only a temporal re-
sponse to the permissiveness of the 1960's and early 1970's.90
Whatever the future, 2.7 percent does not reflect a "prevalent"
lifestyle which the judiciary should feel compelled to recognize.
Sociological research contradicts the Marvin court's assump-
tion about the beneficial incidents of cohabitation. A 1977 study
found that cohabitation was not a more effective mate selection
device than traditional courtship patterns.9 1 Moreover, several
potentially negative consequences of cohabitation have been
identified. One recent project reports that 63 percent of cohabitat-
lence is not indicative of legislative intent. See, e.g., People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d
1119, 1127 n.4, 459 P.2d 225, 229 n.4, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 n.4 (1969).
87. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
88. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20,
No. 349, MAmrAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1979 at 3 (1980) (em-
phasis added); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1980 at 44, Table No. 60 (101st ed. 1980).
89. Newcomb, Cohabitation in America; An Assessment of Consequences, 41 J.
MARR. & FAm. 597 (1979).
90. Cassano v. Durham, 180 N.J. Super. 620, 436 A.2d 118 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1981).
91. D. Olday, Some Consequences for Heterosexual Cohabitation for Marriage
(1977) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington State University), cited in
Newcomb, supra note 89, at 599.
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hig couples marry (usually not each other) or separate within two
years.92 Furthermore, after learning that males generally enter
cohabitation seeking only sexual gratification while females gen-
erally are motivated by marriage desires,93 one researcher con-
cludes that females are at greater psychological risk in
cohabitation relationships. 94 This data, unexplored in Marvin,
suggests that the state need not feel compelled to legitimize co-
habitation by equating it with marriage in a wrongful death
context.
Practical Problems
Practical problems arise ff wrongful death actions are extended
to cohabitants. Unless a cause of action is to be granted to par-
ticipants in every living arrangement of any duration, courts must
distinguish sufficiently long-lasting relationships from fleeting
ones. Such distinctions are anything but precise. For example,
recent English case law suggests that twenty-one years of cohabi-
tation is sufficient permanence, 95 but that five years is not.96 In a
1980 American case,9 7 a thirty-year relationship qualified a cohabi-
tant's loss of consortium claim. The court recognized the diffi-
culty and futility in attempting any definition of the requisite
permanence, and ended the opinion relying on future attorneys to
make the distinction and to avoid frivolous claims. Worse yet,
marriage and cohabitation may exist simultaneously; one cohabi-
tant may be married to a third person. Granting the wrongful
death action would present courts with a conflict between cohabi-
tant and the legal spouse. Under the statute, the court must
weigh the relative claims of the heirs. If the tortfeasor's assets
are limited, a choice between cohabitant and spouse must be
made. "Both cannot be afforded any more than can polygamy."98
92. Glick & Norton, Marrying, Divorcing, and Living Together in the U.S. To-
day, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, POPULATION BULLETIN (1977), cited in New-
comb, supra note 89, at 599.
93. Arafat & Yarburg, On Living Together Without Marriage, 9 J. SEX RE-
SEARCH 97 (1973), cited in Newcomb, supra note 89, at 599.
94. Newcomb, supra note 89, at 599.
95. Twenty-one years was sufficient to consider the surviving cohabitant a
member of the decedent's family in Dyson Holding v. Fox, 3 All E.R. 1030 (1975),
cited in Freeman & Lyon, Towards a Justification of Rights of Cohabitees, 130 NEW
L.i. 228, 228 (1980).
96. Freeman & Lyon, supra note 95, at 228.
97. Buloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078, 1088 (D.N.J. 1980).
98. Deech, The Case Against Legal Recognition of Cohabitation, 29 INT'L &
Social Philosophy-The Loss of Liberty
The statement that granting a wrongful death cause of action to
a cohabitant will lead to a loss of liberty9 9 probably sounds like an
overstatement to many; however, such loss is probable. Already
Marvin is used to extend legal equivalence between spouse and
cohabitant.10o An innovative court might also rely on California
Government Code section 12955101 to further attach legal signifi-
cance to cohabitation.102 Foreseeably, a decision equating cohabi-
tation with marriage in wrongful death will itself become a
springboard to further legal interference with cohabitation. The
problem with this is that, as state intervention increases, an indi-
vidual's freedom to engage in a relationship free from governmen-
tal control ceases. 103 Liberty is lost when choice is destroyed;
choice is destroyed when cohabitation becomes marriage-like be-
cause only one type of relationship remains where two types ex-
isted before. Denial of legal equivalence between cohabitant and
spouse is necessary to end the post-Marvin trend and to preserve
privacy.10 4 Liberty, of course, is seldom without cost; unfortu-
nately, the occasionally harsh result accompanying denial of the
cohabitant's claim is the price exacted.
Tort Principles-Damage Limitation
California tort law generally is concerned with loss compensa-
tion and distribution.105 These principles, standing alone, might
require that a cohabitant be accorded a wrongful death recovery.
CoMP. L.Q. 480, 490 (1980), reprinted in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEM-
PORARY SOCIETIES, AREAS OF LEGAL, SocrAL AND ETHicAL CHANGE 299, 306 (1980).
99. The foundation of American culture, liberty, requires that the government
refrain from interfering with an individual's action unless society's safety is
threatened. See Magid, John Stuart Mill, in HISTORY OF POITICAL PUELOsomHY 751
(L. Strauss & J. Cropsey 2d ed. 1972).
100. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 4.
102. Statutes may represent broad policy objectives to be integrated into the
common law much like a set of prior judicial decisions. The cited statute may rep-
resent a policy of equating cohabitation with marriage in limited circumstances
and may be used by a court to rationalize further expansion. See Landis, Statutes
and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934).
103. State control of marriage is so extensive that an index to California stat-
utes requires twenty pages to list the statutes which relate to marriage. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West Supp. 1982) (solemnization of marriage); CAL. CrV.
CODE § 4101 (West Supp. 1982) (capacity to consent and consummate marriage);
CAL. CiV. CODE § 42G1 (West Supp. 1982) (marriage license). Case law similarly
illustrates the state interest in marriage. See, e.g., Deyoe v. Superior Court, 140
Cal. 476, 74 P. 28 (1903).
104. "Privacy" denotes an area of thought and action free from governmental
interference. Deech, supra note 98, at 480.
105. Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 229, 301-03
(1981).
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However, a competing policy consideration, damage limitation, al-
so finds expression in California case law and supports denial of
wrongful death actions to the unmarried partner.0 6
In Dillon v. LeggO1 7 the California Supreme Court explained
that the critical question in limiting a tortfeasor's liability was the
concept of foreseeability. The Dillon court concluded that a negli-
gent driver who strikes a child may reasonably foresee that the
mother will witness the incident and suffer emotional distress. In
Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., the court relied on Dillon to
grant a spouse's loss of consortium claim. The Rodriguez court
used 1972 census data showing that up to 89.7 percent of Ameri-
can men were married to conclude that one "may reasonably ex-
pect that the injured person is married and that his or her spouse
will be adversely affected .... -"8 Of course, census data alone
does not determine foreseeability; however, the chasm between
Rodriguez's 89.7 percent and the 2.7 percent cohabitant rate is
substantial enough to suggest that a tortfeasor may not reason-
ably foresee an injured cohabitant. 09
Another damage limitation approach has been termed the "fam-
ily damages doctrine." It reduces tort system cost by diminishing
total family awards."1o This approach operated in Borer v. Ameri-
can Airlines"' to preclude a parent-child loss of consortium claim
in spite of Rodriguez's spousal consortium holding. The Borer
court emphasized that social policy, not logic and sympathy, must
limit liability: "We cannot ignore the social burden of providing
damages .... Realistically the burden of payment... must be
borne by the public . "... -12 Borer limited total family damages
because the injured member retained a cause of action. "[T]he
family as an economic unit suffered a reduction, but not an elimi-
nation of damages."l13
106. See Levy & Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CALF. L
REV. 497 (1979).
107. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
108. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 400, 525 P.2d 669, 680, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 776 (1974) (emphasis
added).
109. Cf. Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980) (demurrer
sustained to cohabitant's Dillon-like claim; cohabitant was not a foreseeable
plaintiff).
110. Levy & Ursin, supra note 106, at 521.
111. 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977).
112. Id. at 447, 563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
113. Levy & Ursin, supra note 106, at 524. Other cases expressing this damages
approach are Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal. 3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal. Rptr.
The justification found in Borer is similarly applicable to the co-
habitant's wrongful death claim. One-fourth of all cohabitating
couples have children living in the household."4 Because the
wrongful death statute provides a remedy for any dependent mi-
nor, the "family" will enjoy some recovery in these cases; dam-
ages are merely diminished, not eliminated. This result also finds
support in Steed, in which the court noted that its seemingly
harsh denial of the stepchild's claim was mitigated by the
mother's wrongful death recovery." 5
The "family damages" approach is inapplicable to the remain-
ing nonchild cohabitant cases; however, the policy suggested in
Walters v. Sloan" 6 supports denial in these circumstances. In
Walters, the court held that firefighters and police officers could
not recover for negligently inflicted injuries suffered on the job.
The court's focus on special disability benefits awarded to these
injured workers implies that plaintiffs may be denied tort recov-
ery when sufficient compensation from other sources is per-
ceived.1 7 Insurance benefits and testamentary provisions supply
a recovery that can be deemed sufficient in light of the other con-
siderations militating against the cohabitant's claim. Those who
see only injustice when a surviving cohabitant has neither of
these benefits are reminded that all human activity involves costs.
Having chosen the benefits of an unregulated relationship, the co-
habitant must also shoulder its costs.
CONCLUSION
The California legislature has excluded cohabitants from
wrongful death suits. Although the Moragne decision invites
courts to expand wrongful death actions, an analysis of Califor-
nia's statute reveals that its legislature has occupied the field and
that its judiciary is powerless to expand the cause of action.
Technical justifications, unarticulated in Justus, support that
court's holding whether the criteria be general rules of statutory
interpretation, the Moragne guidelines, or analogies to other
cases. Additionally, public policy is best served by California's
329 (1974), and Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 461, 563 P.2d 871, 138 Cal. Rptr.
315 (1977).
114. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20,
No. 349, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1979 at 4, Table E
(1980).
115. 12 Cal. 3d at 126, 524 P.2d at 808, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 336; see Levy & Ursin,
supra note 106, at 525.
116. 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977).
117. Levy & Ursin, supra note 106, at 530.
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continued adherence to its exclusion of cohabitants from wrong-
ful death actions.
MICHAEL FISH

